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CIVIL RULE 90.3: JUDICIAL DISCRETION
UNDER ALASKA'S CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINE
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1980's, the role of the Alaska trial judge in child support
proceedings changed dramatically. Judges may no longer exercise un-
fettered discretion in awarding support on a case-by-case basis.
Rather, they must determine child support in accordance with Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3 (the "Rule" or "Rule 90.3"),1 which, in
most cases, mandates adherence to a quantitative formula. 2 Where the
income of the noncustodial parent is easily substantiated and custody
arrangements are uncomplicated, calculation of awards under the
formula is a straightforward matter requiring minimal judicial input.
In Alaska, as well as in other states, widespread discontent with
the highly discretionary case-by-case method of award determination
prompted the adoption of mandatory, quantitative formulas for calcu-
lating awards of child support. These guideline formulas were care-
fully fashioned to account for myriad circumstances affecting awards
of support and to limit the instances in which trial judges may deviate
from the formulas and use the traditional method. The Alaska
Supreme Court responded to the latter concern in Coats v. Finn,3 hold-
ing that good cause for deviation from the guideline formula of Rule
90.3(a) arises only when a party requesting deviation shows by clear
and convincing evidence that manifest injustice would result from ap-
plication of the formula.4 Under this high standard, which was incor-
porated into paragraph (c) of the Rule in 1990, Alaska trial judges
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1. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3.
2. Unless otherwise indicated by context, this note is referring to the quantitative
formulas of both paragraphs (a) and (b) of the Rule whenever the term "quantitative
formula," "mathematical formula" or "Rule 90.3(a)" is used. Paragraph (a) provides
a formula for determining child support in sole custody cases, whereas paragraph (b)
applies to cases of shared physical custody (where all children stay with one parent at
any one time).
3. 779 P.2d 775 (Alaska 1989).
4. Id. at 777.
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enjoy extensive discretionary authority only when application of the
guideline formula would clearly result in a substantially unfair award.5
This note argues that while the guideline formula of Rule 90.3(a)
was meant to ensure uniform and adequate awards, the standard for
deviation from the formula set out in Coats is too high. A simple pre-
sumption in favor of the formula would safeguard the adequacy, uni-
formity and simplicity of awards without exacting too high a toll on
fairness and flexibility. The trial judge's exercise of substantial discre-
tionary power in that small minority of cases in which deviation is
justified will be tempered by the balancing of equities implied in Rule
90.3(a) itself and by the social changes that prompted adoption of the
Rule.
The remainder of this note is arranged in three parts. Part II will
provide background information on Alaska's adoption of the child
support guideline. Part III will explore those situations requiring the
exercise of judicial discretion in applying Rule 90.3(a), as well as those
cases suggesting the need for substantial judicial intervention and thus
deviation from the formula. Part IV will examine the current restric-
tions on deviation from the formula and will argue for a reduction in
this standard.
II. THE ROAD TO MANDATORY GUIDELINES
A. Case-by.-Case Adjudication
In Alaska, as in most other states, the cornerstone of child sup-
port adjudication traditionally had been judicial discretion. 6 Trial
judges considered evidence of the cost of raising the child,7 the lifestyle
of the family prior to separation and the expenses normally incurred
by the parents. 8 Two equitable principles guided a judge's disposition
of the child support issue: the reasonable needs of the child, including
prior station in life, and the parents' relative ability to pay support.9
5. Id.
6. Irwin Garfinkel & Marygold S. Melli, The Use of Normative Standards in
Family Law Decisions: Developing Mathematical Standards for Child Support, 24
FAM. L.Q. 157, 157 (1990).
7. Id. at 163 (budget submitted by the custodial parent was the base for begin-
ning calculations of child support awards).
8. Diane Dodson, A Guide to the Guidelines: New Child Support Rules Are Help-
ing Custodial Parents Bridge the Financial Gap, FAM. ADvoc., Spring 1988, at 4, 5-6;
Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 6, at 163.
9. Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211, 1216 (Alaska 1989) (citing Pattee v.
Pattee, 744 P.2d 658, 662 (Alaska 1987); Hunt v. Hunt, 698 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Alaska
1985)). Hunt held that the equitable principles used in the modification context,
namely the total cost of supporting the children, considering the station in life to
which they are accustomed, and the relative financial situations of the parents, should
apply in initial award determinations. Hunt, 698 P.2d at 1172 (citing Headlough v.
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The examination of evidence in light of these sometimes antagonistic
principles allowed Alaska trial judges to tailor support orders to the
equities apparent in each case and promoted responsiveness to the
unique concerns of litigants.
Certain practical considerations and social presumptions, how-
ever, may have had as much influence in support award determina-
tions as did the principles acknowledged in cases and codes.' 0
"[C]ourts operated on the premise that nonresident parents were enti-
tled to spend their money as they saw fit, with the child receiving some
of what was left."'" Additionally, the fear that an obligor parent
would refuse to pay or would subsequently reduce his ability to pay
may have dissuaded courts from issuing adequate support orders
12
These unspoken premises probably affected child support decisions in
Alaska as widely as in other jurisdictions.
The case-by-case approach not only suffered under the weight of
such pernicious principles, but also from flaws inherent in a highly
discretionary method of decision-making. The inability of parents,
counsel and judges to determine the reasonable cost of raising a child
undermined the adequacy of awards.' 3 The use of custody, property
and visitation rights as bargaining chips,14 and the inability of courts
and agencies to enforce support orders also vitiated the adequacy of
support awards.15 Furthermore, judges did not treat similarly situated
Headlough, 639 P.2d 1010, 1013-14 (Alaska 1982); Curley v. Curley, 588 P.2d 289,
292 (Alaska 1979)); see also Marilyn R. Smith, Grounds for Deviation, FAM. ADvoc.,
Spring 1988, at 22, 23.
10. Legislatures frequently specified principles for courts to meet in divorce or
child support cases. Smith, supra note 9, at 23. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.24.160(a) (1990) ("[TIhe court may provide... for the payment... as may be
just and proper for the parties to contribute toward the nurture and education of their
children ....").
11. See Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 6, at 163.
12. Id. at 163-64 (fear that nonresident parent, traditionally father, would ab-
scond or stop working and leave child in worse position used to justify small support
awards).
13. Robert G. Williams, Guidelines for Setting Levels of Child Support Orders, 21
FAM. L.Q. 281, 287 (1987); see also CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT CoMM'N, RE-
PORT TO THE HONORABLE BILL SHEFFIELD, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF ALAKA,
at VI-1 (1985) [hereinafter COMM'N REPORT].
14. See Smith, supra note 9, at 22 (noting that child and custodial parent often
have different interests where support payments are exchanged for particular property
division); COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at V-2 (needs of child may be lost in par-
ents' eagerness to resolve financial questions surrounding divorce).
15. See, e.g., Charles Brackney, Battling Inconsistency and Inadequacy: Child
Support Guidelines in the States, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 197, 197 n.2 (1988) (citing
federal income withholding, tax refund intercepts and liens on property as recently
adopted tools to combat widespread noncompliance with support orders).
1991]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
litigants uniformly. 16 Counsel and parties had difficulty predicting
awards, and perceived inequities probably contributed to noncompli-
ance by noncustodial obligor parents.17 Ultimately, the inadequacy,
inconsistency and complexity of child support awards became a prob-
lem of national scope, prompting legislation by the federal
government.
B. Federal Law: The 1984 and 1988 Acts
The failure of the states' child support systems directly impacted
federal welfare spending. Inadequate awards, devaluation of awards
through inflation18 and changed circumstances, and ineffective en-
forcement of support orders contributed greatly to the impoverish-
ment of custodial parents and their dependents.19 The economic
plight of single parent families resulted in increased federal spending
under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program
("AFDC").20
In response to this increasing demand on AFDC, Congress
passed the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984
("CSEA"), 2' which conditioned the states' receipt of AFDC monies
upon adoption by each state of child support guidelines. State guide-
lines could be adopted by statute, rule or regulation,22 provided they
were based on numeric criteria that would determine the computation
of support obligations.23 Although the federal impetus was to pro-
mote more adequate and consistent awards by curtailing judicial dis-
cretion, "[t]he 1984 amendments required only that the guidelines
serve as advisories to the determination of a child support award."'24
16. See, e.g., Andrea Giampetro, Mathematical Approaches to Calculating Child
Support Payments: Stated Objectives, Practical Results, and Hidden Policies, 20 FAM.
L.Q. 373, 377 (1986) (concluding that empirical studies support proposition that judi-
cial discretion approach yields inconsistent results).
17. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS,
at 11-5 (1987) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES].
18. Id. at 11-3.
19. Brackney, supra note 15, at 198-99 (noting that inadequate support orders are
one source of "feminization and cradlization of poverty").
20. See Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 6, at 159-60. The purpose of AFDC is to
"encourag[e] the care of dependent children in their own homes... by enabling each
State to furnish financial assistance... to needy dependent children." 42 U.S.C. § 601
(1988).
21. Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 18, 98 Stat. 1305, 1321-22 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667
(1988)) (amending Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669
(1988)).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1988).
23. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c) (1990).
24. Janice 17. Munsterman, Claire B. Grimm & Thomas A. Henderson, The Cur-
rent Status of Slate Child Support Guidelines, STATE CT. J., Spring 1990, at 4, 7. For
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The federal Family Support Act of 1988 ("FSA")25 strengthened
CSEA by requiring "states to apply a rebuttable presumption that the
child support guideline amount is correct in any given case."'26 The
federal rules of the Department of Health and Human Services al-
lowed deviation from a guideline only upon "[a] written finding or
specific finding on the record of a judicial or administrative proceeding
for the award of child support that the application of the guidelines
established.., would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case
.... as determined under criteria established by the State."' 27 These
rules required that the states' criteria for deviation from the guidelines
"must take into consideration the best interests of the child."' 28
In combination, CSEA and FSA severely restricted judicial mold-
ing of support awards. To a large extent, discretion of trial judges in
support proceedings is now limited to cases where state law justifies
deviation. Alaska's transition from a discretionary system to a guide-
line system of child support determination, in response to these federal
statutes, culminated in the promulgation of Alaska Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 90.3.29
C. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3
In compliance with CSEA, Alaska Governor Bill Sheffield ap-
pointed the Alaska Commission on Child Support Enforcement (the
"Commission") on November 21, 1984 to study the state's child sup-
port program.30 In its 1985 report to the Governor, the Commission
a more thorough analysis of the guideline provisions of CSEA, see generally Williams,
supra note 13.
25. Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2)
(1988)).
26. National Center on Women and Family Law, Inc., The Impact of the Family
Support Act of 1988 on Family Law Practice, 22 Clearinghouse Rev. 1098, 1098 (1989)
(citing FSA § 103 (1988)) [hereinafter Impact on Family Law Practice].
27. 56 Fed. Reg. 22,335, at 22,354 (1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
§ 302.56(g)).
28. Id. The federal rules restricting the states' statutory right to set the criteria
for rebuttal were meant to ensure that "the child's best interests are a primary consid-
eration in any decision to deviate from the guidelines amount, while allowing for other
valid factors to be considered." Id. at 22,346. The language of the rule marks a re-
treat from the intrusive language of the proposed rule, which had required that "the
State's criteria [for rebuttal] must be based on the best interests of the child." 54 Fed.
Reg. 37,866, at 37,869 (1989) (proposed Sept. 13, 1989) (emphasis added).
29. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3. Having adopted a presumptive formula in 1987,
Alaska was already substantially in compliance with FSA before the effective date of
the federal act.
30. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at 11-1.
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recommended the development of a presumptive formula for the es-
tablishment and modification of support orders. After reviewing vari-
ous formulas used in other states and discussed in the literature,31 the
Commission recommended adopting a variation of Wisconsin's per-
centage of income formula.32 The Commission believed that this
formula would best promote the goals of objective, adequate and uni-
form awards.33 Additionally, the formula was simple to administer,
eliminated lengthy fact-finding and allowed for prediction of awards
by the parties and their counsel. 34 The Commission further recom-
mended that deviation from the formula be allowed only upon a show-
ing by clear and convincing evidence that applying the formula would
result in manifest injustice.35
Effective August 1, 1987, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted 36
Rule 90.3, setting forth a statewide child support guideline based on
the percentage of income formula.37 Under this formula, courts calcu-
late child support awards in sole custody cases38 as a percentage of the
31. Id. at VI-2 to VI-3. The Commission reviewed the Melson, Wisconsin, Cas-
setty, Washington and Income Shares formulas. For detailed analysis of these formu-
las, see DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 11-65 to 11-95. As of early
1990, thirty-two states used the income shares formula, fifteen states used the percent-
age of income formula or a variation thereof, and three states used the Melson
formula. Munsterman, Grimm & Henderson, supra note 24, at 6.
32. COMM'i'J REPORT, supra note 13, at V-1. For information on the practical
and theoretical aspects of the Wisconsin percentage of income method, see Thomas A.
Bailey, A Practitioner's Approach to Child Support, Wisc. BAR BULL., June 1987, at
19; DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 11-85 to 11-87. See infra notes
36-40 and accompanying text for a description of Alaska's variant of the percentage of
income formula.
33. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at V-1.
34. Id. A strong argument in favor of simple formulas is that they facilitate the
updating of awards and thereby promote continued adequacy. Garfinkel & Melli,
supra note 6, at 174-76, 178; see COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at VI-2.
35. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 13, at III-1.
36. Federal regulations specifically contemplate judicial action as one means of
establishing guidelines. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56 (1990). "[T]he Advisory Panel on Child
Support Guidelines recommends that states implement guidelines, if feasible, under
court rules." Williams, supra note 13, at 311. The supreme court's constitutional
authority to adopt the Rule, however, may be subject to debate. The Rule was
adopted under the court's inherent authority to interpret legislation, rather than its
rulemaking power. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3, note.
37. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3. For a brief history of the adoption of the Rule, see
Cox v. Cox, 776 P.2d 1045, 1047-48 (Alaska 1989).
38. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(a), (b), (f) (determination of sole as opposed to
shared physical custody). Rule 90.3 does not provide a formula specifically addressed
to divided custody cases (where at any one time physical custody of children is split
between parents), although paragraph (b) may provide a useful starting point to deter-
mine the appropriate child support award in these cases. Id. cmt. V(C).
256 [Vol. 8:251
CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINE
noncustodial parent's adjusted annual income.39 The percentage var-
ies according to the number of children to be supported: the noncus-
todial parent's income is multiplied by 20% for one child, 27% for
two children, 33% for three children and an extra 3% for each addi-
tional child.4° In 1990, the Rule was amended, explicitly adopting the
Commission's recommendation that deviation from the formula be al-
lowed only upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence of mani-
fest injustice.41 Rule 90.3 is now the standard in Alaska with which
all initial and modified child support orders and agreements must
comply. 42
III. THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION: CASES REQUIRING THE
EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IN APPLYING THE FORMULA
AND CASES REQUIRING DEVIATION FROM THE
FORMULA
The mandatory nature of the Alaska child support guideline does
not require rigid adherence to an objective formula under all circum-
stances. Because of complexities in the guideline formula, application
of the formula itself in fashioning an award may require significant
decision-making by the trial judge. Furthermore, some cases may
present sufficiently unusual circumstances to justify a departure from
the rigid formula of Rule 90.3(a) and thus permit a more substantial
judicial molding of support orders.43 This section will explore both
types of cases.
39. Id. R. 90.3(a). The phrase "adjusted annual income" is distinct from "ad-
justed gross income" as used in income tax law. Id. R. 90.3(a)(1). See infra notes 44-
50 and accompanying text.
40. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(a)(2). See generally Dodson, supra note 8, at 10
(noting that the percentages used by the Alaska child support guidelines "are signifi-
cantly lower than the Income Shares Model at all but the highest income level," and
are among the lowest in states using a percentage of net income formula).
41. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(c). Exceptions to the guideline formula had been
allowed upon a showing of good cause under the 1987 and 1989 versions of the Rule.
See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. The 1990 amendment's expansion of
paragraph (c), concerning the standard for deviation from the quantitative formula of
paragraph (a), reflects the supreme court's holding in Coats v. Finn, 779 P.2d 775, 777
(1989).
In addition to the expansion of paragraph (c), the 1990 amendment slightly modi-
fies every other paragraph of the Rule and adds new paragraphs (g) and (h) concern-
ing travel expenses and modifications, respectively. An unofficial commentary has
also been inserted after the Rule. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. I(A).
42. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. I(C); Cox v. Cox, 776 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Alaska
1989) ("Parents may not make a child support agreement which is not subject to the
rule.") (footnote omitted).
43. "[T]he absence of any grounds for rebuttal [of the presumption of guideline
correctness] would appear to be inconsistent with the statutory language [of FSA] and
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A. Cases Requiring Discretion in the Application of the Formula
Under Rule 90.3, the initial step in calculating child support is
the determination of the noncustodial parent's adjusted annual in-
come.44 There is some complexity in this initial step due to possible
confusion with principles of federal income taxation. For instance, for
child support purposes, in-kind income,45 fringe benefits, 46 and the ac-
celerated portion of depreciation 47 are included in gross income.
These amounts are not normally included in the computation of in-
come for federal taxation purposes.48 In addition, adjustments to
gross income under the Rule must be distinguished from tax law ad-
justments. Prior ordered child support or alimony49 and the portion
of withheld taxes actually due50 may be used to reduce gross income
under the Rule, while they may not constitute additional adjustments
for tax purposes.5 1 These complexities, and others mentioned in the
commentary to the Rule,52 present difficulties of application, but in
most cases should not call for the exercise of judicial discretion.
There are situations, however, in which a judge must exercise dis-
cretion to determine the noncustodial parent's adjusted annual in-
come. For example, "[t]he court may calculate child support based on
a determination of the potential income of a parent who voluntarily is
unemployed or underemployed. s53 The need for discretion may also
arise when an obligor parent has experienced erratic annual income in
the past. Since the relevant annual income figure used to determine
the child support award is future expected income, which is usually
evidenced by past income, "the court may choose to average the obli-
gor's past income over several years." '54
The role of judicial discretion in applying the formula is revealed
in at least two other paragraphs of the Rule. In sole custody cases,
the intent of Congress that guidelines be used as a rebuttable presumption in the estab-
lishment and modification of all orders in the State." 56 Fed. Reg. 22,335, at 22,348
(1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(9)).
44. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(a)(1).
45. Id. cmt. III(A)(19).
46. Id.
47. Id. cmt. III(B).
48. See MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION,
30-48, 156-57 (3d ed. 1988).
49. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(a)(1)(B) and cmt. III(D).
50. Id. R. 90.3(a)(1)(A) and cmt. III(D).
51. See ROSE & CHOMMIE, supra note 48, at 436-42.
52. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. III(A)-(E).
53. Id. cmt. III(C).
54. Id. cmt. III(E); see also Bergstrom v. Lindback, 779 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Alaska
1989) ("[W]e believe that the superior court has discretion whether to include in in-
come amounts voluntarily deposited into deferred income compensation accounts.").
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"[tihe court may allow the obligor parent to reduce child support pay-
ments up to 50% for any period in which that parent has extended
visitation over 27 consecutive days."'55 In shared custody cases, the
court may find that the "percentage of time each parent will have
physical custody will not accurately reflect the ratio of funds each par-
ent will directly spend on supporting the children .... ,,56 Such a
finding would require an adjustment to the calculation of support.57
Although unusual income patterns and complicated visitation ar-
rangements call for the exercise of judicial discretion under the
formula, calculation of support awards in most cases is a straightfor-
ward task. In the bulk of cases, the obligor parent's adjusted annual
income is multiplied by the percentage dictated in the Rule, and the
resulting support award is achieved without resort to the subjective
judgment of the court.5 8
B. Cases Requiring Departure from the Formula
The need for sound judicial discretion in child support adjudica-
tion is amplified when departure from the guideline formula, rather
than application of the formula, is at issue. A request for deviation
upward or downward5 9 may be granted by the court for good cause.60
If an exception to the guideline is granted, the award will be deter-
mined by the traditional balancing of equities.61
55. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(a)(3).
56. Id. R. 90.3(b)(2).
57. Id.
58. Id. cmt. VI(A) (child support in great majority of cases should be awarded
under 90.3(a) or (b)).
59. See Coats v. Finn, 779 P.2d 775, 777 (Alaska 1989) (Good cause for deviation
exists where an award "substantially exceeds or falls short of the amount needed to
provide for the child's reasonable needs.") (emphasis added). Courts generally have
resisted upward deviation, viewing guidelines as a ceiling rather than a floor. Impact
on Family Law Practice, supra note 26, at 1098.
60. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(c)(1). Deviation from the guideline formula must be
limited to situations where good cause is demonstrated, as numerous exceptions would
undermine the Rule and its goals of uniform and adequate awards. See id. cmt.
VI(A); Coats, 779 P.2d at 777-78.
61. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(c)(1)(A), (c)(2) (A just and proper exercise of the
court's discretion will "take[ ] into account the needs of the children, the standard of
living of the children and the extent to which that standard should be reflective of the
supporting parent's ability to pay."); see Coats, 779 P.2d at 776 ("Rule 90.3 does not
abrogate the general rule that a non-custodial parent is obligated to contribute only a
fair share of the amount required to meet the reasonable needs of the parties' minor
children."); see also Memorandum from John Reese to Civil Rules Committee (Jan.
28, 1987), reprinted in ALASKA BAR ASS'N, CLE SEMINAR, THE NEW AND IM-
PROVED CIVIL RULE 90.3: CHILD SUPPORT FOR THE '90's, at 86, 89 (1990) (sug-
gesting that proposed Civil Rule 90.3 should "make it clear that the court in the
proper circumstances has the power to exercise its discretion in setting support above
or below the formula amounts .... .") [hereinafter Reese Memorandum].
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Good cause for deviation may be found by the court where unu-
sual circumstances exist 62 or where the obligor parent has gross in-
come below the poverty level. 63 Where the obligor parent has annual
income in excess of $60,000, the court may make an additional award
if it would be "just and proper" to do so.64 While these three excep-
tions are not exclusive, the Rule indicates that deviation based on
other exceptions will be rare. 65
The exception for unusual circumstances presents the most fertile
ground for deviation. The unofficial commentary to the Rule presents
numerous scenarios where the exception for unusual circumstances
might apply. The strongest arguments for deviation probably will
arise in cases where the custody of children is divided,66 a custodial
parent with justifiably insignificant income has child care expenses, 67
children of a prior relationship who live with the obligor parent are
suffering hardship,68 or a property settlement intended to alter child
support has been entered.69 In rare cases, an agreement of the par-
ties70 or the presence of subsequent children 7' may justify a variation
from the guideline calculation. In only the most exceptional cases will
the existence of prior or subsequent debts, 72 the income of a new
spouse, 73 or the age of children74 be grounds for deviation.
62. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(c)(1)(A).
63. Id. R. 90.3(c)(1)(B).
64. Id. R. 90.3(c)(2). Additional awards made under paragraph (c)(2) are not
strictly considered deviations for good cause from the formula, since paragraphs (a)
and (b) do not apply to the extent that the obligor parent has adjusted annual income
exceeding $60,000. Id. Thus, a party seeking an additional award need not prove by
clear and convincing evidence that manifest injustice would result from limiting the
award to the amount calculated under paragraph (a) of the Rule. The essential fact in
Coats was that custody was divided, not that the noncustodial parent earned in excess
of $60,000 annually.
65. Coats, 779 P.2d at 777; ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. VI(A).
66. ALASKA R. CIv. P. 90.3 cmt. V(C).
67. Id. cmt. VI(B).
68. Id. cml. VI(B)(3).
69. Id. cmt. VI(B)(9).
70. Id. cmt. VI(B)(1). An agreement of the parties is not itself an unusual cir-
cumstance justifying deviation. See Bergstrom v. Lindback, 779 P.2d 1235, 1237-38
(Alaska 1989) ("[A] parent may not waive the requirements of Civil Rule 90.3 by
contract."). In holding that Rule 90.3 supersedes Malekos v. Yin, 655 P.2d 728
(Alaska 1982) (parents could agree to disregard court-ordered support award as long
as doing so was not harmful to child), the supreme court stated: "Parents may not
make a child support agreement which is not subject to the rule." Cox v. Cox, 776
P.2d 1045, 1048 (Alaska 1989).
71. ALASKA R. CIv. P. 90.3 cmt. VI(B)(2).
72. Id. cmt. VI(B)(5).
73. Id. cmt. VI(B)(6).
74. Id. cmt. VI(B)(7).
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Other forceful arguments in support of deviation from the Rule
may be offered by counsel. The court may hear arguments concerning
"family size, health issues, other extraordinary expenses, seasonal in-
come factors, or other matters of good cause which would make the
percentage formula not responsive to the actual situation of the par-
ties."' 75 Counsel should also be familiar with the economic data that
form the basis of the guideline.76 "Where appropriate, counsel may
then argue that certain types of expenditures should be added or, on
the other hand, deleted" from the award calculation. 77
In general, if calculation under Rule 90.3(a) would result in an
award that offends the principles embodied in existing case law or stat-
utes, then requests for deviation stand a chance of success. These
principles include protection of the reasonable needs of the child, tak-
ing into consideration prior station in life, or the relative financial situ-
ation of the parents.78 Thus, "where the custodial parent's income
exceeds that of the noncustodian, a downward adjustment in the
guideline amount may be appropriate .... Comparison of the post-
divorce standards of living [might also be] a source of justification for
a deviation. '79
The commentary to the Rule suggests, however, that neither the
relocation of the custodial parent 8° nor the denial of visitation',
should justify a reduction in support. In addition, evidence pertinent
to the issues of health and education costs, 82 shared custody arrange-
ments, 83 extended visitation84 or travel expenses 85 would not normally
75. Reese Memorandum, supra note 61, at 89. For information concerning ex-
traordinary expenses in support determinations, see Sally Goldfarb, Child Support
Guidelines: A Model for Fair Allocation of Child Care, Medical, and Educational Ex-
penses, 21 FAM. L.Q. 325, 330-37 (1987).
76. Dodson, supra note 8, at 7. Commentators have suggested that guideline per-
centages based on other states' guidelines may not accurately reflect the economic
data on intact family spending. Dodson notes that, in Wisconsin, an efflort was made
to establish appropriate percentages of income for child support awards based on eco-
nomic data, and percentages were then lowered because they were perceived to be
"too high." "This reduction proliferates when other states model their guidelines on
these guidelines rather than on the original economic data." Id.
For further information on the economic data underlying the percentage of in-
come and the income shares methods of calculating child support, see id. at 9-10;
Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 6, at 165-68; DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES, supra
note 17, at 11-129 to 11-154.
77. Dodson, supra note 8, at 7.
78. Smith, supra note 9, at 23.
79. Id. at 24.
80. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. VI(B)(4).
81. Id. cmt. VI(B)(8).
82. Id. R. 90.3(d).
83. Id. R. 90.3(b).
84. Id. R. 90.3(a)(3).
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justify a variation, since the Rule addresses these circumstances
directly. 86
The good cause exceptions that may justify deviation from the
guideline formula enhance the responsiveness of Rule 90.3 to different
fact situations. The benefits and administrative costs of highly respon-
sive child support adjudication, however, must be weighed against the
goals of the Rule. Departure from the guideline formula upon a mini-
mal showing of unfairness might sacrifice the uniformity and predict-
ability of support awards. The level of unfairness that will justify a
departure from the formula must therefore be set high enough to pre-
serve the integrity of the Rule.
IV. THE STANDARD FOR DEVIATION FROM THE GUIDELINE
FORMULA: COATS v. FINN
Coats v. Finn87 is important to attorneys who litigate child sup-
port issues because its holdings set the parameters for successful re-
quests for deviation from the Rule. Coats sets the evidentiary
requirements for deviation, introduces the manifest injustice standard,
and confirms the court's commitment to the equitable principles em-
bodied in prior law.
As previously noted, the Rule has always allowed a court to vary
a support award for good cause. 88 Earlier versions of the Rule listed
categories of cases which might warrant a departure from the formula,
but gave no standard explicitly limiting the trial court's authority to
grant requests for deviation. Coats changed this by establishing a stan-
dard to be applied when a party requests a deviation from the formula.
The current Rule, reflecting Coats, allows the court to deviate from
the guideline formula only "upon proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence that manifest injustice would result if the support award were
not varied."' 89
In Coats, custody of the children was divided. The daughter
spent alternate weeks with each parent, while the son spent only two
evenings during alternate weeks with his father.90 At issue was the
amount of the father's obligation for the support of his son. The
mother proposed two alternative calculations, one based on the sole
custody provision of the Rule and the other based on a shared custody
85. Id. R. 90.3(g).
86. See Coats v. Finn, 779 P.2d 775, 777 n.6 (Alaska 1989) (issues already fac-
tored into the guideline are not themselves enumerated exceptions).
87. Id.
88. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(c)(1); see supra note 41.
89. ALASKA R. CIv. P. 90.3(c)(1).
90. Coats, 779 P.2d at 776.
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analysis. 9 1 Under either proposal, the resulting award would have
been greater than under the father's suggested calculation. Without
specifying which of the mother's alternative calculations was applica-
ble, the trial court "adopted as [its] own the [mother's] argument and
analysis on the child support amount issue." 92
The father appealed on the ground that the award was unreasona-
ble. The Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged that deviation was pos-
sible where a support award calculated under the Rule produced an
unfair result. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, however,
holding that "[i]n the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, we are unable to say that the $1000 award substantially ex-
ceeded [the father's] fair share of the amount needed to satisfy [the
son's] reasonable needs."' 93 The court's emphasis on the needs of the
child and on the fair contribution of the obligor parent was meant "to
harmonize Rule 90.3 with the prior case law."
'94
This section will examine the burden and standard of proof under
Coats, the introduction of the manifest injustice standard, and the har-
monization of the Rule with equitable principles established in prior
law.
A. The Burden and Standard of Proof Under Coats v. Finn
Under Alaska law, a presumption in favor of one party will shift
the burden of production to the objecting party, but will not shift the
burden of persuasion. 95 Thus, the presumption in favor of child sup-
port awards based upon the guideline would shift the burden of pro-
duction to the party seeking deviation from the guideline, but the
burden of persuasion would seem to remain with the party seeking the
guideline award. This general rule of evidence regarding presump-
tions applies in all civil actions and proceedings unless a statute, rule
or judicial decision provides otherwise.9 6 Although Rule 90.3 is silent
as to which party bears the burden of persuasion in requests for devia-
tion, Coats holds that "the reasons for the departure [from the guide-
line] must be supported by specific findings, and the burden of
persuasion is on the objecting party." v9 7 Coats thus shifts the burden of
persuasion to the party requesting deviation from the formula.
91. Id. at 776 n.1.
92. Id. at 776 n.2.
93. Id. at 778.
94. Id.
95. ALASKA R. EVID. 301.
96. Id.
97. Coats, 779 P.2d at 777.
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Coats further bolsters the presumption in favor of guideline calcu-
lations by adopting a heightened standard of proof. Civil cases ordina-
rily apply the preponderance of the evidence standard, which requires
the party bearing the burden to produce evidence leading the trier of
fact "to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable
than its nonexistence. ' 98 Coats, however, establishes that departure
from the formula must be based on clear and convincing evidence. 99
Under the clear and convincing standard, the trier of fact "must be
persuaded that the truth of the contention is 'highly probable.' -1w
This heightened standard of proof,101 together with the requirement
that the party requesting deviation bear the burden of persuasion, 10 2
forms a strong presumption in favor of guideline awards.
Other states that have experimented with a heightened standard
of proof in the deviation context have subsequently abandoned this
approach. For example, Wisconsin, one of the leading states in guide-
line development, and the state that Alaska used as a model, has low-
ered its standard of proof.I03 At the time of the Alaska Commission
Report, Wisconsin law had allowed deviation from percentage stan-
dards upon a showing of unfairness by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 1 4 Shortly after the effective date of Alaska's Rule 90.3,
however, the Wisconsin legislature lowered its standard of proof to a
preponderance of the evidence.105 The lower standard was considered
98. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339, at 957 (Ed-
ward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK].
99. Coats, 779 P.2d at 777.
100. MCCORMICK § 340, at 959-60 (quoting J.P. McBaine, Burden of Proof. De-
grees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REV. 242, 246, 253-54 (1944)).
101. A heightened standard of proof in the context of deviations from the quantita-
tive formula may have only a slight effect. Because evidence of unusual circumstances
is often subject to proof by reliable documentary evidence, it is likely that authenti-
cated documentary evidence would satisfy even the highest standard of proof. For
example, the extraordinary expenses of a handicapped child are often supported by
relevant documentary evidence of past expenditures. The heightened standard under
Coats, then, may prove not to be a substantial obstacle for a party requesting
deviation.
102. The effect of shifting the burden of persuasion in requests for deviation may
also be minimal. See generally, MCCORMICK § 336, at 947 n.6 (burden of persuasion
has become largely a technique of wording instructions to juries); id. at 947 ("Judges,
trying cases without juries, pay only lip service to [the burden of persuasion] .... ").
103. The change in Wisconsin law is of interest because in adopting the clear and
convincing evidence standard, Coats took judicial notice of the Child Support En-
forcement Commission's report to Governor Sheffield, which in turn had based its
recommendation, at least in part, on the Wisconsin guideline. Coats, 779 P.2d at 777
n.7; see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
104. Act of July 17, 1985, ch. 29, sec. 2361, § 767.25(lm), 1985 Wis. Laws 480
(amended 1987).
105. Act of Aug. 6, 1987, ch. 37, Sec. 1, § 767.25(lm) (intro.), 1987 Wis. Laws
546-47 (codified at Wis. STAT. § 767.25(lm) (Supp. 1990)).
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easier to apply and consistent with the level of proof used in deciding
other issues in divorce proceedings. 10 6 Wisconsin lawmakers had con-
cluded that practical difficulties in the application of the clear and con-
vincing standard outweighed the increment of protection gained by
use of that higher standard. 107
B. Manifest Injustice Under Coats v. Finn
Coats not only clarifies the burden and standard of proof in re-
quests for deviation from the guideline formula, but also introduces
the manifest injustice standard. Although neither Coats nor the Com-
mission Report explicitly defines "manifest injustice," the meaning of
the phrase may be gleaned from an analysis of Coats and an inquiry
into cases decided under the criminal sentencing guideline.
Coats states that "[i]nclusion of a 'good cause' exception does not
mean... that the trial court is free to abandon the formula in every
case."108 Rather, "departure therefrom must be based on... evidence
that manifest injustice would result if the formula were applied."10 9
The court further notes that good cause for variation arises when ap-
plication of the formula would produce an "unfair result." 110 In the
deviation context, "an unfair result is an award which substantially
exceeds or falls short of the amount needed to provide for the child's
reasonable needs,'1l or "which requires the non-custodial parent, un-
reasonably, to contribute substantially more or less than his or her fair
share of the amount needed to satisfy the child's reasonable needs."''
12
Under Coats, then, only an application of the formula of Rule 90.3(a)
that would result in manifest injustice (apparently defined as substan-
tial unfairness) is good cause for deviation.
The examples provided in Coats of substantially unfair awards
provide some insight into the probable impact of the manifest injustice
standard. Where the child support guideline dictates that a noncus-
todial parent must pay more than a fair share of the child's reasonable
needs, the trial judge is not authorized to deviate from the formula.
Rather, a deviation is permitted only when the guideline demands sub-
stantially unfair payments from the noncustodian. Likewise, upward
deviation is permitted only when the guideline provides substantially
low payments to a custodial parent.
106. Telephone interview with Gordon Anderson, Senior Attorney, Wisconsin
Legislative Council (Nov. 21, 1990).
107. Id.
108. Coats v. Finn, 779 P.2d 775, 777 (Alaska 1989).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id. (emphasis added).
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Although the meaning of "manifest injustice" has not been liti-
gated in the context of the child support guideline, proper interpreta-
tion of the phrase has been a central issue in cases decided under the
criminal sentencing guideline. 13 In Lloyd v. State,114 the court of ap-
peals held that "obvious unfairness" accurately defined manifest injus-
tice, and that "a sentence that would 'shock the conscience' . . .
adequately characterizes the manifest injustice standard." ' s The
court failed to see any substantial difference between the definitions
since each characterization, "like the manifest injustice standard itself,
is highly subjective."' "16 Criminal cases subsequent to Lloyd have held
"plainly unfair" sentences to be manifestly unjust."17
Characterizing the manifest injustice standard in the criminal
sentencing context as "plain unfairness," "obvious unfairness" and
"shocking to the conscience" emphasizes the subjective nature of the
standard. Although the standard is probably equally subjective under
the child support guideline,"18 its adoption in Coats still bolsters the
presumption of guideline correctness by preventing judicial interven-
tion in cases where the guideline award can be proven to be only un-
fair, rather than substantially unfair.
C. Harmony with Prior Law
While Rule 90.3 may initially appear to mark a departure from
established principles, Coats makes it clear that the Rule does not ab-
rogate the traditional balancing of the child's reasonable needs with
the obligor parent's relative ability to pay support. 1 9 Rather, awards
calculated under the Rule are strongly presumed to have achieved the
correct balance between these principles. When in extraordinary cases
113. Resort to criminal cases for insight into the meaning of the manifest injustice
standard is not unjustified, since under both guidelines the standard allows a subjec-
tive judgment by the trial judge when the limits imposed by a guideline would result in
unacceptable levels of unfairness. Compare Coats, 779 P.2d at 777 (application of
standard in context of deviation from child support guideline) with Lloyd v. State, 672
P.2d 152, 154 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (application of standard in presumptive sentenc-
ing context). Furthermore, the Lloyd court noted that the manifest injustice standard,
while subjective, did not bestow absolute discretion on the trial judge. Lloyd, 672 P.2d
at 155 n.3.
114. 672 P.2d 152 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
115. Id. at 154.
116. Id.
117. See, eg., Kirby v. State, 748 P.2d 757, 762 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987); Smith v.
State, 711 P.2d 561, 569 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
118. An argument could be made that "substantial unfairness" imports a modicum
of objectivity into the test that is otherwise lacking under the manifest injustice stan-
dard. Unlike "shocking" or "obvious," the term "substantial" may be said to have
quantitative overtones.
119. See supra note 61.
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this presumption is proven incorrect, the Rule allows for judicial bal-
ancing of the equities. The operation of traditional principles within
the guideline and the reversion to these principles in cases of deviation
reveal the degree to which the Rule conforms with prior law.
The federal statutes that mandated the development and the use
of child support guidelines did not dictate the models or the principles
on which the state formulas should be based. 120 Although commenta-
tors had suggested models that would ensure equal standards of living
in the custodial and noncustodial households, most states "chose to
focus on improving the expenditure-based practice courts had been us-
ing." 121 Both the income shares formula used in the majority of states
and the percentage of income formula used in Alaska were based on
economic analyses of spending patterns in intact families. 122
Adopting formulas based on spending in intact families initially
seems to be a fundamental reworking of equitable principles. The in-
come shares formula "attempt[s] to provide post-divorce children with
the percentage of the parents' income which married couples expend
on their children at the same income level, rather than setting awards
based upon need."123 The percentage of income formula presumes
that "the proportion of income parents devote to their children in in-
tact families is relatively constant across income levels," and that ap-
plication of the formula "should result in a non-custodial parent
paying approximately what the parent would have spent on the chil-
dren if the family was intact." 124 Both approaches seem to substitute
consumption patterns in intact families for inquiry into the reasonable
needs of children.
Average spending on children in intact families at particular in-
come levels is pertinent, however, to the determination of the reason-
able needs of a child. At lower income levels, there is little danger that
consumption patterns will reflect anything more than expenditures on
essentials. In this situation, analysis of spending probably provides an
accurate picture of a child's minimal needs. At higher income levels,
the pattern of intact family spending likely includes purchases of lux-
ury items. Contrary to the initial assumption, the inclusion of such
expenditures does not place the economic analysis underlying the
guideline formula at odds with traditional equitable principles, since
prior law explicitly recognized standard of living as important to the
determination of support awards. The guideline formulas of Rule 90.3
120. Dodson, supra note 8, at 5.
121. Id. at 6.
122. See, e.g., Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 6, at 166.
123. Heather R. Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM.
L.Q. 79, 101 (1986) (citing LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION
(1985)).
124. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. II.
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thus do not abandon the principles recognized under prior law, but
instead balance the traditional equities in light of economic evidence
and social reality.
Rule 90.3 should be seen, then, as an improvement on the case-
by-case method of determining support. The child support guideline
accounts for both the child's reasonable needs and the relative finan-
cial situation of the parents without tipping the scales against the
child. The economic data and analyses on which Alaska's child sup-
port guideline is based provide a rational, if imperfect, method for de-
termining a child's reasonable needs. 125 Furthermore, the financial
stake of the public' 26 in the obligor's payment of support instills a
social presumption that the child is primarily entitled to the available
earnings of the obligor. Improvements in the enforcement of child
support obligations 27 alleviate judges' concerns that higher support
awards will result in nonpayment by the obligor parent.' 28 These con-
siderations alter the balancing used in the traditional method of sup-
port determination, which was unduly favorable to the obligor parent,
and thereby allow for fairer support awards.
The improvement in the adequacy of support awards must extend
both to awards calculated under the guideline formula and to awards
determined under the good cause exception of Rule 90.3(c). Just as
traditional principles are balanced in light of new economic evidence
under the formula, so must they be balanced by the trial judge in cases
of deviation 29 in order the reach the fairest possible awards.
125. See Coats v. Finn, 779 P.2d 775, 776 & n.5 (Alaska 1989). Although eco-
nomic analysis of intact family spending offers a better approximation of the cost of
raising a child -than does the traditional budget estimate by the custodial parent, the
studies that ground the current guidelines in the states have been criticized. See, e.g.,
Dodson, supra note 8, at 7 ("[E]xpenses for children may increase after a divorce, and
almost no data exist on expenditures for children in single-parent households ....
Little current data are available on average family expenditures for child care and
extraordinary medical expenses, particularly in single-parent families."). Commenta-
tors have noted that:
none of the [economic] studies ... takes into account the forgone family
income in a two-parent family that results from a parent - usually the
mother - not working or taking a job that pays less than she can command
in the market in order to have time to care for the children.
Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 6, at 168.
126. Garfinkel & Melli, supra note 6, at 162. See supra notes 18-20 and accompa-
nying text (discussing impact of failure of child support systems on federal welfare
spending).
127. See supra note 15.
128. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
129. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(c)(1) ("The court must specify in writing.., the
amount of support which would have been required but for the variation. .. ").
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D. Criticism of the Current Standard for Deviation
The corrective impact of the guideline formula on the balancing
of equities grounding child support determinations suggests that the
standard for deviation from the formula should be reduced. A lower
standard for deviation would have only a minimal effect on the ade-
quacy of child support awards, since Alaska trial judges weigh the
equities in cases of deviation in light of the awards dictated by the
quantitative formula. The uniformity and simplicity of support
awards will be preserved as long as a simple presumption in favor of
guideline correctness is maintained.
The devices used by Rule 90.3(c) to bolster the presumption of
guideline correctness should be abandoned. A strengthened presump-
tion is unnecessary because proper deviation from the quantitative
formula will not undermine the main objectives of the Rule. For this
reason, the court should reconsider its holding in Coats that the bur-
den of persuasion rests on the party requesting a deviation from the
guideline formula. The burden of persuasion should remain with the
party seeking the support order. The presumption in favor of guide-
line correctness would then comport with the general rule of evidence
regarding presumptions in civil actions, with only the burden of pro-
duction being shifted to the party seeking deviation.1 30 Likewise, the
clear and convincing evidence standard of proof for overcoming the
presumption of guideline correctness should be reduced to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence, and the manifest injustice standard
should be replaced by an unfairness standard. Each of these height-
ened standards unnecessarily introduces practical difficulties of appli-
cation into litigation involving requests for deviation.
V. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, the fashioning of a quantitative formula to determine
child support awards and the setting of criteria for rebuttal of the pre-
sumption in favor of the formula involve difficult policy decisions.
Fairness and flexibility must be balanced against the need for ade-
quate, consistent and predictable initial and modified awards. The ad-
ministrative costs of a more flexible system must also be factored into
the policy debate. Nevertheless, the current version of Rule 90.3 in-
hibits the balancing process by severely limiting deviations from the
guideline formula. Setting such a high standard for deviation exces-
sively restricts litigation on the issue of guideline fairness, undermin-
ing the flexibility of the Rule and limiting the compilation of data
essential to the review and improvement of the guideline formula.
These effects are especially regrettable in Alaska, where the levels of
130. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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support demanded by the guideline formula are relatively low and
where, unlike other states,131 the supreme court has recognized the
viability of upward deviation. It seems inconsistent, and unfortunate,
for the court to both recognize the potential for upward deviation and
to severely limit the opportunities for such deviation.
Thomas P. Davis
131. See supra note 59.
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